The eects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on fertility in Africa remains ill understood. To align the contrasting ndings of recent empirical research, we develop a portfolio model that captures the potential trade-o between "quantity" and "quality" of ospring. According to this theoretical model, the overall impact of mortality shocks on fertility is heterogeneous, and involves changes in human capital investment strategies. A key prediction is that investment switching and fertility impacts are conditional on income levels. We use African panel data to test the implications of the model, and nd strong support for key model predictions. In particular, the impact of HIV prevalence on both fertility and human capital investments varies with income in a manner that is consistent with model predictions.
Introduction
HIV/AID represents a rst order challenge for human welfare and economic development, especially in Africa. Worldwide, more than 30 million people are infected with HIV, and Sub Saharan Africa is home to about two-thirds of these infected people. Adult HIV prevalence in
Africa is approximately 5% (UNAIDS and WHO 2007) , but this aggregate statistic conceals considerable heterogeneity. For example, the prevalence rate among prime age workers is as high as 20% in Southern Africa. It is estimated that HIV/AIDS killed about 2 million Africans in 2005, and that HIV/AIDS-related mortality has driven a decline in life expectancy to pre-1970 levels (US Census Bureau, 2005) . It seems intuitive that such a mortality shock will not only cause enormous suering among aected populations, but also involves large economic costs -possibly jeopardizing development prospects for generations to come. An improved understanding of the consequences of the HIV/AIDS mortality shock is important to help policy makers design interventions to cope with these costs and challenges.
To appreciate the long-term consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, analysts need not only consider its eects on mortality and longevity, but also its impact on fertility. Indeed, this relationship is considered to be "one of the most important missing pieces in the puzzle of AIDS and development" (Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011), p.64) . The literature has not reached a consensus regarding the eect of HIV/AIDS on fertility, and the empirical evidence is mixed. While some studies nd that fertility decreases in response to the increased mortality risk (Young (2005) and Young (2007) ), other studies argue there is no signicant eect, or that behavioral responses may invite an increase in fertility rates (Fortson (2009) , Kalemli-Ozcan (2012) and Juhn, Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2013) ). As discussed below, these dierences in econometric outcomes may be attributed to dierences in HIV prevalence data, variation in econometric specications, and variation in countries included in the sample (Kalemli-Ozcan (2012) ). In this paper we focus on the latter possibility, and consider the possibility that the relation between HIV/AIDS and fertility is heterogeneous -varying across the African continent in a systematic fashion. Specically, we probe whether the relation between mortality shocks and fertility is conditional on income levels, so that cross-country studies seeking to tease out average eects may hide important underlying patterns and relations in the data. While the theory is framed in terms of the HIV/AIDS mortality shock, we emphasize the intuition is more general and may also be used to understand the impact of positive shocks to longevity, such as eventuating from new developments in medicine.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a portfolio model to study fertility, allowing heterogeneous treatments so that the eect of mortality shocks on fertility varies with pre-shock income levels. A key element of the model is that households choose both quantity and quality of their ospring, so our model builds on work by Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Barro (1988) . We nd that fertility may increase or decrease in response to increased life expectancy, depending on income levels, and that quantity-quality trade-os are driving these outcomes. Specically, choices with respect to both fertility and human capital accumulation are determined by the so-called Sharpe ratio associated with ospring of low and high quality.
We demonstrate that, for intermediate income levels, mortality shocks will invite a downward adjustment in human capital investments and a matching upward response in fertility. In contrast, households in low and high income categories -to be made more precise belowrespond by reducing fertility. This nding may help to reconcile the conicting evidence on the fertility-eects of mortality shocks that has heretofore characterized the literature.
Second, we test our theoretical model using a large sample of African countries. We nd strong empirical support for key model predictions. Most importantly, the eect of the HIV/AIDS mortality shock on fertility is heterogeneous and varies with income while both the poorest and rich countries respond to the shock by decreasing fertility, we show that mid-income countries respond by increasing fertility and simultaneously "switching" from high-quality to low-quality ospring.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize the evolving literature on the impact of the HIV/AIDS mortality shock on fertility, and use this to motivate our theoretical model. In section 3 we present our theoretical model, and derive key testable implications. In section 4 we introduce our data and outline our identication strategy. In section 5 we present our empirical results, focusing on both fertility and human capital accumulation. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Overview
Fertility choice is a classical theme in economics. Modern economic thinking about fertility goes back to pioneering work by Becker and Lewis (1973) who studied the trade-o between child quantity and quality. Building on this idea, endogenous fertility has been an element of, for example, long-term growth theory (e.g., Becker and Barro (1988) , Galor and Weil (1999) ).
The quantity-quality model of fertility typically suggests fertility should increase in response to increased mortality risk (reduced longevity). As returns to investments in human capital fall, parents choose to invest less in each child, but may also decide to have more children.
Obviously, the relation between HIV/AIDS and fertility is much more complex than this.
In the context of this epidemic other "micro" eects are relevant as well. For example, there is a direct physiological (biological) eect, associated with reduced fecundity and perhaps lower energy levels to engage in sexual activities. Sexual behavior may also change as people seek to reduce the risk of infection (by foregoing unprotected sex, reducing fertility as a by-product), or if mothers who are aware of HIV transmission channels try to avoid giving birth to infected children. In addition, there may be important "macro" eects if mortality shocks are suciently severe. Young (2005) and Young (2007) , for example, points to increasing capital to labor ratios.
As returns to labor increase, so do the opportunity costs of time for women, which will invite a (further) fall in demand for ospring. This mechanism explains why a relatively short-lived shock may have persistent fertility eects (think of the plague in Europe). In sum, theory does not produce an unambiguous prediction concerning the eect of increased HIV/AIDS mortality risk on fertility the relation may be positive or negative, or these opposing eects may oset each other so that a zero net eect results.
This ambiguity is reected in empirical analysis. This work received an important impetus by the work of Young, who argued that the HIV/AIDS mortality shock represents an economic boon to Africa. Combining country-level variation in HIV prevalence and individual-level fertility data, he studied the economic consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic for South Africa (Young (2005) ) as well as for a sample of 29 African countries (Young (2007) ). A key element of the story is a drop in fertility resulting from the epidemic. Physiological eects play a minor role in this process, and Young attributes the bulk of the fall in fertility to a reduced demand for children. This is reected in an increased demand for contraceptives (including, but not limited to, condoms) and a reduction in survey-based expressed fertility. The mechanism linking mortality to fertility includes lower dependency ratios (increasing eective participation) and higher capital to labor ratios. Even after controlling for the loss of prime age working age adults and the epidemic's eect on human capital accumulation, Young (2007) concludes a net windfall gain eventuates, which may be used to increase current consumption or to nance patient care programmes: "the behavioral response to the HIV epidemic creates the material resources to ght it" (p.322).
Not surprisingly, this analysis has proven controversial and has been contested. Crucially, the negative relationship between HIV/AIDS and fertility appears to be absent in analysis based on more recent rounds of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). These data contain improved estimates of HIV prevalence based on individual testing of survey respondents, rather than voluntary testing of pregnant women. Moreover, the most recent fertility estimates suggest a stall, or even reversal, in African demographic transition patterns. Focusing on a sample of 13 African countries, Juhn et al. (2013) nd no eect of community HIV prevalence on fertility choices of HIV-negative women.
1 Kalemli-Ozcan (2012) uses a panel of 44 African countries and probes various model specications (exploiting between and within-country variation) as well as dierent HIV data, and nds there is no robust relation between HIV prevalence and fertility -some models produce positive outcomes, others negative ones, but most models do not produce any signicant association. These results support earlier evidence by Fortson (2009) , who using a sample of 12 African countries, concludes "there is no evidence that living in an area with high levels of HIV has a sizable eect on the fertility of those who are not directly aected (i.e., infected) by the virus" (p.172).
Hence, the literature contains dierent sometimes opposite estimates of the overall eect of mortality shocks on fertility. As mentioned, this divergence can to some extent be attributed to the nature of HIV prevalence data across DHS rounds. Recent data, based on individual testing of respondents, are more accurate, and allow distinguishing between the eect of own infection status versus that of community-wide HIV prevalence (Juhn et al. (2013) ). But there are other reasons for the lack of consensus. For example, assumptions with respect to HIV prevalence for the pre-1990 period, for which no HIV data are available, matter for model outcomes (Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011)), as do assumptions with respect to the identication strategy whether the analyst focuses on cross-country or within-country variation, and on assumptions with respect to clustering of standard errors (Kalemli-Ozcan (2012)).
Yet another reason for conicting outcomes is variation in the sample of countries included in the analysis. If the eect of mortality shocks on fertility is conditional on country characteristics, such as income levels, then an aggregate analysis that lumps together all countries might obscure rather than reveal key relationships (see Table 1 for an overview of the countries involved in the various studies). Moreover, dierent sub-samples drawn from the overall sampling frame may produce dierent estimates. We will probe this latter possibility in our own empirical work below.
Before presenting our portfolio-approach to mortality shocks and fertility, we briey introduce another relevant strand of the literature on the consequences of mortality shocks. In addition to aecting the number of children, mortality shocks may aect the level of investments in human capital per child -the possibility of a quantity-quality trade-o discussed above. Young (2007) is optimistic about the adverse eects of the epidemic on the quality of children. Analysing the accumulation of human capital among orphaned children, he concludes HIV prevalence "does not appear to exert any consistent dampening eect on the accumulation of human capital" (p.305). But this result has been disputed as well. Using more recent data, Fortson (2011) considers the eect of HIV/AIDS induced mortality risk among African children and youths (not just among orphans), and concludes it slows down human capital acand fertility.
cumulation. This is reected across a range of indicators: years of schooling, school attendance, primary school completion, and progress through school. While these outcomes are consistent with a reduction in the expected return to investments in human capital, they may also be due to changes in family resources, or to changes in market prices (e.g. wages). Regardless of the exact channel, the overall eect appears large and signicant, for both orphans and nonorphans. For related insights, refer to Meltzer (1992) , Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2006) , and Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009).
Insert Table 1 approximately here.
3 Theoretical Model
Portfolio Model of Fertility Choice
We assume agents view children as investment goods rather than durable (consumption) goods.
The assumption is considered to be realistic particularly for developing countries, where the pension systems and nancial markets are underdeveloped (c.f. Portner (2001)). So parents invest in human capital of their children, and expect a certain return after their ospring has matured. Like other investments, the rate of return on investing in ospring is uncertain and several factors, including disease, may inhibit human capital from maturing. Consider an agent with mean-variance utility preferences. Her portfolio consists of two assets: a risky asset, children, and a risk-free asset, possibly a salaried job or accumulated savings. The utility maximization problem is given by:
where w t is initial wealth of parents, which can be taken as both human and physical capital.
r p,t+1 and σ p,t+1 are the return and the variance of the portfolio. r t+1 is the return on raising children; and r f,t+1 (w t ) is the risk-free rate, which we treat as an increasing deterministic function of w t (reecting that high physical or human capital facilitates access to high-return investment opportunities, or better salaried jobs, c.f. Claessens (2006) and Sahn and Alderman (1988) ). We also assume the coecient of relative risk aversion, γ to be a decreasing function of wealth (DRRA utility), and that r t+1 |F t , ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ). It is easy to verify that the following holds,
where F t represents the information set up to time t. The distribution of the return on the portfolio in Equation (3) allows us to rewrite the optimization problem as:
Solving for α t yields,
where λ is the so-called Sharpe ratio for investments in (the human capital of) children. Reecting the dependence of the risk free asset on wealth, this ratio is a decreasing function of wealth, so we have:
Equation (5) shows that the fraction of wealth allocated to bearing and raising children increases with the attractiveness of osping, as captured by the Sharpe ratio (λ) but decreases with its riskiness (σ) and the agent's degree of risk aversion (θ). As both λ and θ decrease with wealth levels, it is not evident how wealth aects investments in children. Denoting the number of children by n t and the cost of raising a child by C t respectively, we obtain,
Next, assume there are two types of children -a "high-quality" type (H) and a "low-quality" type (L) where quality simply reects investment in human capital during (early) childhood.
Denote these investment costs by C t where, obviously, C H > C L . The return to these types is dened as r t+1 , where
In words, raising high-quality type children yields higher expected returns, but also implies incurring higher costs and generating higher risks. As a benchmark model we assume agents can only raise one type of children, so they treat all children equally at least when they 2 Throughout this paper, we use subscript "L" to represent variables associated with low-quality children and subscript "H" to represent variables associated with high-quality children.
are born. According to the model, the optimal number of type-specic children is given by:
The maximized expected utility from high and low quality of ospring are, respectively:
Otherwise, she is indierent between asset L and asset H.
3
Proposition 1 states that the decision on the type of ospring only depends on the attractiveness of children as an investment opportunity, as reected by the Sharpe ratio.
The proof of Proposition 2 is as follows.
contrast, if λ L < λ H , the relationship becomes ambiguous. Proposition 2 implies that agents choosing low-quality type ospring have more children than agents chosing the high-quality type (quantity-quality trade-o).
Figure 1 shows how optimal fertility varies with wealth. For low wealth levels, λ H = λ L so the agent chooses low-quality ospring. As wealth increases, so does fertility, reecting greater ability to invest in ospring. However, Sharpe ratios also change, as depicted in Figure 2 .
Specically, both Sharpe ratios decrease with the wealth level, but the high-quality ratio falls more slowly so that eventually the two curves (may) intersect. When that happens, so that λ H = λ L , then agents switch from low to high-quality ospring, and fertility drops abruptly ( Figure 1 ). Further increasing wealth implies that, again, fertility increases which simply reects that wealthier households can aord to invest more in ospring.
Insert Figure 1 approximately here.
Insert Figure 2 approximately here.
3 The result immediately follows from a comparison between Equation (9) and Equation (10).
Individual Responses to a Mortality Shock
We can actually apply this framework to analyze the fertility responses to various sorts of shocks in developing world, where the children are more likely to be taken as investment goods. But in this paper, we narrow our focus and only elucidate the eects of a mortality shock on fertility
decisions. In what follows, a mortality shock reects a permanent increase in the probability that ospring will die before becoming productive (or, alternatively, it lowers the expected return on investments in human capital). We assume the shock leaves the variance of returns unaected. Since the return to the high-quality type is characterized by higher variance, the decrease in expected return of the high-quality type is larger than that of the low-quality type.
Denote these shocks to the returns on high and low-quality types by m H and m L , respectively.
We assume that
where a > 0, b > 0, c > 1, and d > 0. The Sharpe ratios before and after the mortality shock associated with both types are given by:
where λ B H and λ B L represent the before-shock Sharpe ratios for the high and low-quality types, and where λ A H and λ A L denote the after-shock Sharpe ratios. In what follows we will consistently use the superscript B (A) to denote before (after) mortality shock variables. The critical wealth level where parents switch from the low to the high-quality is obtained by equating λ B H and λ B L (λ A H and λ A L after the shock), so we get:
We assume that cσ L − σ H > 0, then w B < w A , which ensures that after the mortality shock, some parents switch from high to low-quality type but not the other way around. The 4 To ease the notation, we suppress the time representation "t" in what follows.
type-switching region induced by mortality shocks is w B , w A and the width of the region, I, is given by,
where
It is easy to verify I is increasing in c and decreasing in both D σ and b. Figure 3 illustrates how type-switching is aected by the mortality shock. Compared to the before-shock case (with w B = 1.4) the intersection of the two Sharpe ratios moves to the right after the mortality shock, and now occurs at a greater level of wealth (with w A = 1.9). Hence, a fraction of the population, endowed with intermediate levels of wealth between w = 1.4 and w = 1.9, switches its investment strategy and opts for low-quality ospring rather than the high-quality type after the mortality risk of their ospring has been shocked up. The poor (w < 1.4) and rich (w > 1.9) are unaected in terms of the type of children they desire, and continue to opt for the low and high-quality type, respectively.
Insert Figure 3 approximately here.
Mortality Shocks: Aggregate Response
We now turn to the aggregate fertility response to a mortality shock, paying special attention to the pivotal role of wealth as a determinant of investments in human capital. Assume wealth in a country is uniformly distributed; w ∈ [w,w]. For simplicity, we normalizew − w to one, so that aggregate wealth of a country with upper boundw is given by,
Hence, there is a one to one correspondence between the upper bound,w and the total wealth of the country, W . Aggregate fertility, then, is given by,
This outcome is graphically depicted in Figure 4 . As aggregate wealth levels increase, fertility rst increases, then decreases, and nally increases again. These dynamics capture the interplay between the direct income eect (raising demand for ospring) as well as the indirect eect via the incentive to invest in human capital. Across a range of wealth levels there exists a tradeo between quantity and quality of ospring.
Insert Figure 4 approximately here.
Insert Figure 5 approximately here.
How does a mortality shock aect aggregate fertility? The model yields positive and negative eects, which may help us to understand the ambiguous empirical evidence that heretofore dominates the literature. Figure 5 shows the aggregate fertility for countries with dierent levels of wealth, before and after the mortality shock. N B and N A , are the aggregate fertility before and after the mortality shock, respectively, and W B and W A are the matching threshold wealth levels.
As shown in the top panel, a mortality shock moves the entire fertility distribution to the right. In the bottom panel we summarize the implications in terms of changes in fertility (i.e., fertility after the shock minus fertility before the shock). This net eect may be positive or negative-depending on the income level. Hence, the impact of HIV/AIDS on fertility is heterogeneous, and should vary across samples (that is; when dierent samples contain countries with dierent income levels). In samples dominated by lowest-income countries, the mortality shocks lowers the average fertility rate. However, samples containing sucient intermediate income countries may display a positive average treatment eect. We will return to this issue below.
Dene the "transition region" at aggregate level as the region between the two critical income levels, W B and W A , where countries switch from full investment in low-quality children to having both types. This is the region where fertility would be falling in the absence of the mortality shock, but is actually increasing in the presence of the mortality shock. We can prove that, as long as the cost of raising a high-quality child is suciently large (relative to the cost of raising a low-quality type), the transition region extends tow = w B . 5 For this reason, we
The one to one correspondence between the upper boundw and aggregate wealth of the country, W implies that the threshold before the mortality shock is given by,
Similarly, the threshold after the mortality shock is given by,
Therefore, as long as 
Thus, the dierence between N B and N A is,
It can be easily veried that
The top panel of Figure 5 demonstrates that total fertility before the mortality shock decreases over the interval [W B , W A ], while after the mortality shock fertility increases. Hence, to ensure that the intersection of N B and N A exists between W B and W A , the aggregate fertility associated with wealth level before the mortality shock (denoted by N B,A ) should be smaller than that after the mortality shock (denoted by N A,thre ). N A,thre is given by,
The value of N B,A depends on the relation between w B and w A − 1. In what follows, we discuss two cases: w B > w A − 1 and w B ≤ w A − 1.
1. w B > w A − 1. There exist m thre l and m thre u such that m thre l < m L < m thre u , which implies that, to ensure the existence of transition, mortality shocks cannot be too small nor too large. The intuition is that if mortality shocks are "too big", even type-switching agents will not increase their number of children as income increases because of the extremely low return on ospring. In contrast, if the shocks are "too small", every agent only slightly reduces her ospring, regardless of the type, and type-switching does not occur.
2. w B ≤ w A − 1. There exists m thre such that m L < m thre . Since w B ≤ w A − 1 ensures that shocks cannot be very small, we only have to rule out that mortality shocks are too large. If mortality shocks are "too big", even type-switching agents are not willing to increase their ospring due to the low expected return.
Testable Hypotheses from the Model
Our model, as summarized in Figure 5 , predicts that after a mortality shock the fertility rate decreases for very poor countries. This drop in fertility increases with wealth (region P in the Figure) . Slightly richer countries, such as those in region Q, also experience that the mortality shock reduces fertility, but for these countries the rate of decrease is decelerating with wealth.
Finally, for intermediate-wealth countries, or those in Region R, fertility increases after the mortality shock. Overall, as depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 5 , as wealth increases, the eect of mortality on fertility may be represented by a quadratic function. Based on the U-shape pattern that we observe on the left side of Figure 5 (where we assume African countries are located), we derive the rst hypothesis. Hypothesis 1. The negative eect of HIV/AIDS on total fertility rate is accelerating with wealth rst, then the negative eect becomes decelerating with wealth, nally the eect turns to be positive.
We expect that more complex patterns can be found in datasets that contain a greater spread in wealth levels -that is; in countries containing African and non-African countries (while suering from a similarly dramatic mortality shock). Moving further towards the right of Figure 5 we observe that fertility appears to not respond to mortality for a range of wealth levels (that is; to the right of w A ), and eventually to drop (again).
Another pattern contained in Figure 5 concerns the eect of mortality on human capital accumulation, which we will proxy with school enrollment. According to the model, type-switching is an important reason for changes in fertility following the mortality shock. Hence, we do not predict school enrollment to drop seriously for very poor countries (characterized by low-quality types before and after the shock) or for rich countries (where both before and after the shock most children are of the high-quality type). 6 In both poor and rich countries, the size of the population is aected, but not its composition. However, the same is not true for intermediate-wealth countries, which are characterized by massive dis-investment in human capital, and the associated switch from high to low-quality type ospring. The share of lowquality type children in the population increases, and school enrollment falls accordingly. This observation forms the basis for our second hypothesis: (prev_hiv) data are from UNData. Income level (inc), education level (prise, f prise, mprise, secse), infant-child mortality rate (inf mor and u5mor), total fertility rate (tf r) are from the World Bank Database. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics. The sample has at least 792
observations. Both the coecients of variation for prev_hiv and inc exceed one, indicating the variation is suciently large to capture the eects of HIV and income.
Insert Table 2 approximately here.
Identication and Specication
To identify Hypothesis 1, we follow Fortson (2009) and use a dummy variable, post_90 , which is set equal to one for observations after 1990 to identify the eect of HIV prevalence on fertility.
This rests on the assumption that HIV prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa was very low in the 1980s, and most of the HIV-induced mortality occurred after 1990 (as did, presumably, the behavioral response we are interested in). If so, we may use 1990 to identify the before-after eect of HIV. We also introduce an interaction term capturing the product of income level (gross national income per capita, inc), and the post_1990 dummy variable, to identify how income mediates the impact of the mortality shock. We use average income level (gross national income per capita) as a proxy of wealth, since income is highly correlated with wealth, especially at the aggregate level. Hypothesis 1 predicts the eect of income should be quadratic. We introduce time-varying co-variates to cope with potential omitted variable bias and, since we have a panel of country level data, we also use xed eects. This amounts to the following specication:
where tf r it is total fertility rate for country i in year t. Since tf r is bounded by zero, we take its log so that the error term more closely resembles a normal distribution. Next x it is a matrix of co-variates, consisting of education and the infant-child mortality rate. Education level controls for other preference to human capital than income concerns. We have two measures of education; primary school enrollment rate, prise and secondary school enrollment rate, secse.
According to Zhang (1990) , Doepke (2005) and others, infant-child mortality rate controls for the replacement eect, which can lead to high fertility rates if infant mortality is high. We have two such measures of the infant-child mortality rate; inf mor and child mortality rate under 5, u5mor. Finally, α i is the country xed eect. We may transform the specication into:
The eect of the mortality shock on total fertility rate is quadratic in income levels. If our hypothesis holds, then α 1 and α 2 should be negative, and α 3 is positive. As income rises, fertility rst decreases sharply, then decreases more slowly, and nally increases. We refer to Equation (29) as Specication I in what follows.
To avoid the measurement error issue in Young (2005) , as pointed out by Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011), we also employ another measure of HIV/AIDS. That is, we use the timevarying measure of the prevalence of HIV, denoted as prev_hiv. This implies specication II, where we again expect the eect of the mortality shock to be quadratic in income levels:
We also expect the eect of mortality shock is quadratic to income level.
To provide further evidence to Hypothesis 1, we narrow our focus on the second part of the hypothesis. Above a certain income level, the drop in fertility rate due to mortality shock slows down with income rising, and eventually the eect turns positive. Taking a similar strategy as above, we use the post_90 dummy to identify the eect of mortality shock, then introduce the interaction term inc × post_90 to capture the change mediated by income. Specication III is:
log (tf r it ) = γ 0 +γ 1 post_90 it +γ 2 inc it ×post_90 it +γ 3 inc it +ρ x it +γ i + it if inc >ī nc,
whereī nc is a threshold above which the negative eect starts to decelerate with income. It can be transformed into
If our hypothesis holds, γ 1 should be negative and γ 2 should be positive. Of course we can also use prev_hiv to estimate this model, which produces Specication IV:
log (tf r it ) = γ 0 + γ 1 prev_hiv it + γ 2 inc it × prev_hiv it + γ 3 inc it + ρ x it + γ i + it if inc >ī nc.
To identify Hypothesis 2, we also take 1990 as the shocking time, and use the ve-year lagged variable of post_90 to capture the eect of mortality on human capital. Following Fortson (2011) , present school enrollment rate depends on HIV prevalence ve or more years ago, when the ospring was born. We take primary school enrollment as the dependent variable, yielding Specication V:
where the primary school enrollment rate is denoted by prise. We do not only test the eect of HIV/AIDS on overall enrollment, but also on female enrollment and male enrollment separately. If Hypothesis 2 holds, then above a certain income level where type-switching occurs, the parameter θ 1 should be negative. Table 3 reports the estimation results of Specication I. Since we have two measures for education and infant-child mortality, we have four combinations of control variables. In column 1, we take prise and u5mor as co-variates, and nd that the estimation results are perfectly in line with our predictions. The coecient to post_90 is negative, indicating that HIV reduced fertility when income is low. The coecient of interaction term inc × post_90 is negative, and that of inc 2 × post_90 is positive. These coecients provide the U-shape curve of mortality shocks discussed above. All the estimated parameters are signicant. In column 2, we use secse and u5mor as controls. In column 3, prise and inf mor are used, and secse and inf mor are used in column 4. Overall, the estimation results tend to be consistent with our predictions, and most coecients are statistically signicant. The signs of the coecients in column 2 are also of the right sign, but not signicant. This may be due to multi-collinearity. The correlation of inc × post_90 and inc 2 × post_90 is 0.94, so multi-collinearity concerns may eventuate, lowering the eciency of our estimations.
Empirical Results

Cross-Country Evidence
To avoid potential measurement error problems, we next employ prev_hiv as measure of HIV, or test Specication II. Table 4 shows the estimation results. Across the columns in this Table we use the same combinations of controls as in Table 3 . Overall, as before, the estimated coecients are consistent with Hypothesis 1. That is, the coecients of prev_hiv and inc × prev_hiv are consistently negative and signicant. In two out of four specications, the coecient of inc 2 × prev_hiv is signicantly positive. Based on the parameter in column 1, Figure 6 depicts how fertility is aected by the mortality shock across a range of income levels.
The eect is negative for low incomes. As income rises, the eect drops further, until average income equals $5, 940 per year (or about twice the average income level in our sample). As income increases further, households switch from high to low quality ospring, and the negative eect of mortality shock shrinks. Finally, for average incomes exceeding $15, 286 per year, we observe that the HIV epidemic raises fertility rates. This is just within sample observations for our panel, but it is evident that most countries in our sample are far removed from this critical income level.
Insert Table 3 approximately here.
Insert Table 4 approximately here.
Insert Figure 6 approximately here. Table 5 and Table 6 , which focus on the dynamics in regions Q and R (in the top panel of Figure 5 ), further support Hypothesis 1. When income exceeds a certain threshold, the negative eect of HIV on fertility is decelerating with income, and eventually turns positive.
We use post_90 and prev_hiv to identify the eect of the mortality shock, and the eect of income is now identied by the interaction term inc × post_90 and inc × prev_hiv. We simply take $2000 per year as the threshold. The results in Table 5 t our prediction well across almost all columns we obtain signicant coecients of the "right sign". The empirical ndings of Table 6 are less robust, but we nd these results are sensitive to the threshold chosen. For example, when we raise the threshold to $8000 per year, the estimations become signicant and tend to conrm the earlier insights (results not shown but available on request).
Insert Table 5 approximately here.
Insert Table 6 approximately here.
Next, turn to Hypothesis 2, dealing with the impact of mortality on human capital investments. Results are reported in Table 7 . The theory predicts that, for average income exceeding a certain level, HIV/AIDS negatively aects human capital accumulation because of type-switching. We take primary school enrollment as a measure of investment in human capital, and consider also female enrollment rate (column 1 and 4) and male enrollment rate (column 2 and 5) separately. We again take $2000 per year per capita as the threshold. In the rst three columns, we use inc to capture income, and in the next three columns we use a ve-year lagged term of inc to reect that perhaps enrollment rates are determined by both present income as well as income levels at the time when fertility choices were made.
All estimation results strongly support Hypothesis 2 -the coecient of of inc is positive and that of post_90 is negative. All the coecients are statistically signicant. Based on this model, we can estimate the eect of mortality shocks on school enrollment, conditional on income. For example, for an income level of $5000, enrollment rates go down by 5% compared to the before mortality shock situation. Another nding is that the reduction in enrollment for girls is signicantly larger than for boys.
Insert Table 7 approximately here.
We have done ample checks to probe the robustness of our ndings. A sample of these results is presented in Table 8 (qualitatively similar results are found for model specications with other controlsdetails available on request). First, since both the income and mortality shock can have lagging eects, we employ lagged terms of inc and prev_hiv or post_90 to re-estimate Specication I. This approach should also attenuate concerns about potential endogeneity of income and HIV prevalence variables. In columns 1 and 2, we use lagged terms for both income and the mortality shock, and nd rather similar results as those reported in Table 4 and Table   3 . All the coecients are consistent with Hypothesis 1, and most are signicant. In columns 3
and 4 we only use the lagged term of income, and this estimation also supports our predictions.
In columns 5 and 6 we use lagged term income and mortality to test Specication III and IV, using a threshold of $2000 per year. In columns 7 and 8, we only use the lagged term of income. As before, we nd that all the estimated parameters are in line with our predictions, and in most cases, coecients are signicant. Next, since the time span of our data exceeds 30 years, time series issues may emerge. As a simple test, we re-estimate Specications I using only data for the period 1980-2000. As shown in column 9, the estimated coecients are still consistent with our predictions. Finally, we use upper and lower estimates of HIV prevalence provided in the literature to estimate Specications I-IV. Results are provided in Table 9 and, again, they support our main predictions.
Insert Table 8 approximately here.
Insert Table 9 approximately here.
Individual Evidence
As a further robustness check we also probe the association between HIV and fertility using individual-level data. As mentioned, no wealth or income data are available for the pre-2005 DHS rounds, so we cannot capture the shock in 1980s. Instead, we adopt a cross-section specication, and refrain from making strong statements about causal inference -the results in this section are only provided to illustrate there are similar patterns in the individual-level data as in the aggregate data. The individual level data are summarized in Table 10 . The model we estimate follows Juhn et al. (2013) :
where κ 1 is predicted to be negative for poor families, and positive for rich ones. We employ data from the most recent Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in Cameroon and Senegal, which includes information on household wealth. Three measures are taken to capture the fertility choice of woman i in region r and country c: number of birth in last year, last ve year and the whole life. prev_hiv is the prevalence of HIV in the region of residence. We also include regional and national dummies, and control for other co-variates, such as education, age and so on. Figure 7 shows us the rough correlation between the number of births in last ve years and the local prevalence of HIV. The two curves are negatively correlated for low wealth levels. However, and consistent with the theory, as wealth increases, the association changes and turns positive. Table 11 provides similar patterns. In Column 1 to 5, we equally divided the sample into ve groups based on wealth levels. HIV prevalence is negatively associated with fertility for the poorest 20% of families, which is in line with our hypothesis. Also consistent with the theory, coecients are positive for other wealth groups, but here the coecients are not (so) signicant. We speculate this reects modest variation in regional prevalence of HIV (relative to the sample size). In addition, we did several robustness checks (alternative grouping methods, Tobit and Probit models), and found that the associations are always robust.
Insert Table 10 approximately here.
Insert Figure 7 approximately here.
Insert Table 11 approximately here.
Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical literature contains a range of estimates of the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on fertility in Africa varying from negative to positive. One of the reasons for this embarrasing richness of results, we argue, might be a heterogeneous treatment eect. Specically, we explore whether the fertility impact of HIV/AIDS may vary with African income levels. The mechanism we propose to link mortality to fertility, via income, is a so-called portfolio model of ospring in which households choose both the quantity and quality of their ospring. When households can choose between low-quality and high-quality children (distinguished by investments in human capital), aspiring households can adjust their portfolio across two margins in the face of a mortality shock they can adjust their fertility as well as the quality of their children.
Our main result is that, for households within a certain income range (the so-called "intermediate income" household), a mortality shock indeed invites a two-fold revision of their portfolio. They will choose to have more children but invest less per child (i.e., they choose low rather than high quality ospring). Households who are either poorer or richer than these intermediate income households adjust their portfolio only across one margin and, interestingly, their fertility response may potentially oset the response of the intermediate income type.
Specically, because ospring represents a less valuable asset following the mortality shock, both poor and rich households will respond by reducing fertility, investing in risk-free assets instead. The overall fertility response, at the national level, therefore depends on aggregate income (as well as the distribution of income across the three types of households). Our empirical analysis is somewhat rough as it is mainly based on aggregate statistics (household-level income panel data are unfortunately not matching our HIV prevalence data well) and focuses only on average income levels within countries. Nevertheless, our empirical results provide support for the theoretical predictions.
Our estimations suggest that critical switching points are within the range of data of our sample. Specically, we predict that mortality results in under-investment in human capital for a range of incomes exceeding some $6000 per year. Most African countries in our sample actually have average income levels that are (much) lower than this threshold. However, average income levels conceal a great diversity of income within African countries, so within most countries certain social groups (relatively privileged groups, to be sure) may already decide to under-invest in the education of their ospring because of the risk implied by such investments. L (solid line) are the Sharpe ratios for high-quality and low-quality children before the mortality shock. λ A H (dash-dotted line) and λ A L (dashed line) are the Sharpe ratios for highquality and low-quality children after the mortality shock. w B (w A ) is the critical individual wealth level for type-switching before (after) the mortality shock. Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2011) Fink et al (2008) Kalemli-Ozcan (2012) Fortson ( Cost of low type children 0.5
C Parameter Values
All of the gures are made using the parameter values shown in Table 12 .
D Conditions for Local Maxima atw = w B
The number of children associated with the aggregate wealth level of W B , N B,thre , is given by,
As any country wealthier than W B has both types of children, the number of children associated with W B + ∆w is,
To ensure the local maxima is obtained atw = w B , the dierence between N B,thre and N B (W B + ∆w) must be negative, 
From Equation (38), we have,
where In this case, the country with wealth of W A has both types of children. Therefore, N B,A is given by,
From Equation (17), we have:
Equation (42) implies that m L can be expressed as an increasing linear function of w A . Using this relation and the condition N A,thre > N B,A , we obtain:
Equation (45) is a quartic inequality with a negative coecient of the highest order term and has a discriminant given by, 
Once again, using the linear relation between m L and w A and the condition N A,thre > N B,A , we obtain:
Equation (55) is a cubic inequality with a negative coecient of the highest order term and has a discriminant given by, ∆ = 18g 2 h 2 i 2 j 2 − 4h 
We assume ∆ < 0, which implies that the associated equation has one real roots and two complex conjugate roots. Thus, we obtain:
where w thre is only one real root. The linear relation between w A and m L ensures that there exists m thre such that m L < m thre .
